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UNFAIR, ABUSIVE, AND UNLAWFUL:
PROTECTING DEBTORS AND SOCIETY FROM
UNRESTRAINED BANK ACCOUNT
GARNISHMENT
Kevin Green*
In the span of a generation, consumer credit has reshaped the financial
lives of millions of Americans. Today, some seventy million Americans have
a debt in collections, and creditors file millions of actions annually to secure
repayment of these loans. Despite the rapid expansion of consumer debt, the
Consumer Credit Protection Act, the only federal law limiting garnishment,
has not been updated since its enactment in 1968. Moreover, courts have
narrowly construed its provisions to permit creditors to empty a debtor’s
bank account to repay a delinquent debt.
To afford debtors the basic protections of the Consumer Credit Protection
Act, this Note argues that courts should enforce its provisions to protect
wages deposited into a bank account. Alternatively, considering the
dramatic expansion of consumer credit and debt collection, this Note argues
that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau should engage in
rulemaking to prohibit the unrestrained garnishment of bank accounts as an
unfair and abusive practice. These federal interventions are critical in
shielding debtors and their families from destitution and in protecting the
public from the onerous social costs of unrestrained debt collection.
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INTRODUCTION
On March 23, 2020, Cheri Long, a nurse at an assisted living center in
West Virginia, was purchasing groceries for her family when her debit card
was declined.1 This was odd because, three days earlier, her biweekly
paycheck was directly deposited into her bank account.2 She quickly learned
that West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. (WVUH) had executed a
garnishment against her account for $3,542.85 to satisfy a medical debt owed
by her husband, Seth.3 Years earlier, Seth was hospitalized, and although he
was insured, he still owed thousands of dollars in hospital bills.4
1. See Alec MacGillis, One Thing the Pandemic Hasn’t Stopped: Hospital Debt
Collections, MLK50 (Apr. 28, 2020), https://mlk50.com/2020/04/28/one-thing-the-pandemichasnt-stopped-hospital-debt-collections/ [https://perma.cc/G5EH-PY97].
2. See Complaint ¶ 19, Long v. Clear Mountain Bank, Inc., No. 20-C-38 (W. Va. Cir.
Ct. Apr. 15, 2020).
3. See id. ¶ 16.
4. See id. ¶ 6.
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Before the garnishment, the Longs were in a good position to weather the
COVID-19 pandemic. Although Seth, a coal miner, was unable to look for
work due to West Virginia’s shelter-in-place order,5 the Longs could depend
on Cheri’s $3,000 in monthly wages to provide for their necessities.6 After
WVUH seized Cheri’s wages from her bank account, the Longs’ finances fell
apart. Without Cheri’s income, the Longs fell behind on their house
payment, had to borrow money from coworkers for gas, and Cheri “couldn’t
even afford to purchase fabric to make [herself] a mask due to the shortage
of personal protective equipment.”7
The Consumer Credit Protection Act8 (CCPA), passed in 1968,9 might
have offered the Longs some relief. The CCPA protects 75 percent of a
worker’s weekly wages from garnishment.10 However, courts have
interpreted its provisions to apply only to wages in the hands of an employer,
allowing creditors to seize 100 percent of wages once they are deposited into
a bank account.11 In an era of ubiquitous direct deposit,12 this interpretation
of the CCPA has rendered the act’s protections against wage garnishment
meaningless, leaving workers like Cheri to ask coworkers for gas money to
drive to work on the front lines of a global pandemic to earn a living she
might never see.13
This Note argues that courts should enforce the CCPA to protect wages
deposited into a bank account. In the absence of judicial enforcement of the
CCPA’s protections, this Note argues that the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB) should engage in rulemaking pursuant to its inherent
jurisdiction under the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 201014 (CFPA)
to prohibit the unrestricted garnishment of wages from a bank account as an
unfair and abusive act.
Part I of this Note provides background on consumer debt, garnishment,
and consumer financial protection law. Part II describes how federal
consumer protection law has been applied to bank account garnishments and
5. See id. ¶ 1.
6. See MacGillis, supra note 1.
7. Joe Smith, Hospitals in West Virginia Are Seizing Bank Accounts, Garnishing Wages
over Unpaid Debt During Ongoing COVID-19 Pandemic, TIMES WEST VIRGINIAN
(Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.timeswv.com/news/hospitals-in-west-virginia-are-seizingbank-accounts-garnishing-wages-over-unpaid-debt-during-ongoing/article_2570a96e-82ac11ea-b6cb-1f200dcac618.html [https://perma.cc/3UD2-5C2N].
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1693.
9. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–
1693).
10. See 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a).
11. See infra Part II.A.1.
12. See Michael W. Kahn, Survey Says: Direct Deposit Is the Overwhelming
Choice, NACHA (Oct. 5, 2020), https://www.nacha.org/news/survey-says-direct-depositoverwhelming-choice [https://perma.cc/9GDE-KTZ5]; NAT’L PAYROLL WK., 2020 “GETTING
PAID IN AMERICA” SURVEY RESULTS 4 (2020), https://www.nationalpayrollweek.com/wpcontent/uploads/2020/09/2020GettingPaidInAmericaSurveyResults.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7CAP-DBYX].
13. See Smith, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
14. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1955 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).

648

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

discusses the regulatory authority of the CFPB. Finally, Part III recommends
judicial enforcement of the CCPA to limit bank account garnishment, and, in
the alternative, recommends that the CFPB prohibit unrestricted bank
account garnishment pursuant to its rulemaking authority.
I. THE BIG BUSINESS OF SMALL DEBTS: AN OVERVIEW OF RISING
CONSUMER DEBT AND GARNISHMENT
Cheri’s story is not unique. Over the last twenty years, Americans have
taken on an unprecedented amount of household debt.15 Over that same
period, the debt collections industry has boomed, growing from six billion
dollars in 1993 to ninety-eight billion dollars in 2013.16 Today, nearly
seventy million Americans have a debt in collections.17
This part overviews the modern scale of consumer debt and the means that
creditors use to collect on delinquent accounts. Part I.A describes the
economic conditions that have pushed many Americans into debt and
discusses the impact that debt collection actions have had on state and local
courts. Part I.B. details how creditors use garnishments to satisfy outstanding
loans. Finally, Part I.C introduces federal and state law limiting the use of
garnishment in debt collection.
A. Causes and Consequences of Rising Consumer Debt
The modern scale of consumer debt is a relatively recent phenomenon.18
Before World War II, personal lending played a minor role in the American
economy.19 However, over the latter half of the twentieth century, the
volume of consumer credit soared. In 1970, 16 percent of American families
held a credit card, compared to 71 percent in 2004.20 During that same
period, outstanding consumer debt increased from $127 billion in 1970 to
over two trillion dollars in 2004.21 This section discusses some of the
economic factors that contributed to the dramatic rise of consumer debt and
highlights how debt collection actions have come to dominate in state and
local courts nationwide.
15. See JENIFER WARREN, PEW CHARITABLE TRS., HOW DEBT COLLECTORS ARE
TRANSFORMING THE BUSINESS OF STATE COURTS 11 (2020), https://www.pewtrusts.org//media/assets/2020/06/debt-collectors-to-consumers.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q62V-J67H].
16. Id.
17. See Andrew Warren, Before COVID-19, 68 Million US Adults Had Debt in
Collections. What Policies Could Help?, URB. INST. (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.urban.org/
urban-wire/covid-19-68-million-us-adults-had-debt-collections-what-policies-could-help
[https://perma.cc/TBT6-GU83].
18. See LISA SERVON, THE UNBANKING OF AMERICA: HOW THE NEW MIDDLE CLASS
SURVIVES 64 (2017) (explaining that Americans’ dependence on debt arose within the span of
a generation).
19. See LOUIS HYMAN, DEBTOR NATION 1 (2011).
20. See Steven L. Willborn, Wage Garnishment: Efficiency, Fairness, and the Uniform
Act, 49 SETON HALL L. REV. 847, 870 n.40 (2019).
21. See Consumer Credit Outstanding, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/HIST/cc_hist_sa_levels.html
[https://perma.cc/23NZ-5X74] (last visited Oct. 7, 2022).
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Stagnant wages and rising costs have played a critical role in placing
Americans so deep in debt.22 Between 1987 to 2017, real income rose 16
percent.23 During this same period, real housing prices increased 290
percent, tuition at public, four-year colleges rose 682 percent, and per capita
personal health-care expenditures rose over 362 percent.24
This mix of soaring costs and unchanged wages has led to a dramatic
decrease in the rate at which Americans save.25 In the mid-1970s, American
households saved nearly 15 percent of their disposable personal income.26
Today, that rate has declined to less than 4 percent.27 According to a more
recent survey conducted by the Federal Reserve, 44 percent of adults reported
that they would be unable to cover an emergency expense costing just $400.28
With insufficient income and savings, Americans increasingly rely on
credit to make ends meet.29 Unexpected costs, like medical expenses, and
essential purchases, like automobiles, are increasingly financed with credit.30
Today, outstanding consumer debt is at an all-time high. In the third quarter
of 2021, outstanding household debt totaled $15.24 trillion, breaking the
record set by the 2008 Great Recession by over $2.5 trillion.31
Many Americans cannot afford to pay back their debt. Before the
COVID-19 pandemic, nearly seventy million Americans had a debt in
collections.32 Over the last twenty years, creditors have increasingly turned
to the courts to recoup payment on these delinquent accounts,33 transforming
state and local courts into debt-collection machines.34

22. See Pamela Foohey, Dalié Jiménez & Christopher K. Odinet, The Debt Collection
Pandemic, 11 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 222, 225 (2020).
23. ADAM J. LEVITIN, CONSUMER FINANCE: MARKETS AND REGULATION 6 (Rachel E.
Barkow et al. eds., 2018); see also DANIEL MARKOVITS, THE MERITOCRACY TRAP 23–24
(2019) (“As the incomes of the top 1 percent have tripled, the median real income has
increased by only about a tenth since 1975, and median incomes have effectively not increased
at all since 2000.”); SERVON, supra note 18, at 51.
24. LEVITIN, supra note 23, at 6.
25. See id. at 5–6; see also SERVON, supra note 18, at 48 (explaining that nearly half of
Americans currently live paycheck to paycheck).
26. LEVITIN, supra note 23, at 5.
27. Id.
28. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING
OF U.S. HOUSEHOLDS IN 2016, at 26 (2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/
publications/files/2016-report-economic-well-being-us-households-201705.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8AVY-T9QS].
Moreover, 30 percent of respondents, representing
seventy-three million adults, reported that they are either “finding it difficult to get by” or are
“just getting by” financially. Id. at 1.
29. See Foohey et al., supra note 22, at 226.
30. See id.; see also LEVITIN, supra note 23, at 9.
31. CTR. FOR MICROECONOMIC DATA, FED. RSRV. BANK OF N.Y., QUARTERLY REPORT ON
HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND CREDIT 1 (2021), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/
interactives/householdcredit/data/pdf/HHDC_2021Q3.pdf [https://perma.cc/FN2E-S898].
32. Warren, supra note 17.
33. See Margot F. Saunders & Johnson M. Tyler, Past, Present and Future Threats to
Federal Safety Net Benefits in Bank Accounts, 16 N.C. BANKING INST. 43, 50–51 (2012).
34. See Paul Kiel & Jeff Ernsthausen, Capital One and Other Debt Collectors Are Still
Coming for Millions of Americans, PROPUBLICA (June 8, 2020, 6:00 AM),
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Until the late 1980s, creditors collected debts directly, generally using
extrajudicial means like harassing debtors over the phone.35 But in the early
2000s, banks adjusted their strategies and began to sell vast packages of
uncollectable debt to debt buyers.36 These debt buyers purchase packages of
debt for pennies on the dollar37 and then sue debtors in local court38 to collect
the full value of a debt.39 Over the last twenty years, the debt-buying industry
has grown over 1,500 percent.40 For example, a single debt buyer, Encore
Capital Group, reports that one in five Americans either owes it money or
has owed it money in the past.41
In the wake of the pandemic, the debt-buying industry has continued to
flourish. Debt buyers posted record earnings in 2020, making a fortune
garnishing COVID stimulus payments.42 Encore Capital Group, the
country’s largest debt buyer, posted a 40 percent increase in annual earnings
in 2020, making over $200 million in profit.43
The proliferation of debt buyers has transformed local court dockets
nationwide.44 Debt buyers file millions of collections actions annually.45
According to a 2020 report by the Pew Charitable Trusts, debt collection suits
have doubled over the last twenty years and are now the most common type
of case in civil dockets.46 In New York City alone, 2.5 million consumer
suits were filed over a five-year period, mostly by debt buyers.47
In sum, consumer credit has transformed the financial lives of Americans
and state and local courts dockets nationwide.48 The following section
describes how creditors use courts to collect delinquent accounts and
https://www.propublica.org/article/capital-one-and-other-debt-collectors-are-still-comingfor-millions-of-americans [https://perma.cc/5XTY-539W].
35. See Saunders & Tyler, supra note 33, at 50.
36. See id.
37. After default, banks are required to “charge off” uncollected debt, meaning that the
loans are no longer reflected as assets on a balance sheet. See CHRIS ALBIN-LACKEY, HUM.
RTS. WATCH, RUBBER STAMP JUSTICE: US COURTS, DEBT BUYING CORPORATIONS,
AND THE POOR 10 (2016), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/us0116_web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5YBF-XBX6]. Instead of taking a total loss, banks package and sell this
debt at steep discounts to debt buyers. Id.
38. See generally Peter A. Holland, The One Hundred Billion Dollar Problem in Small
Claims Court: Robo-Signing and Lack of Proof in Debt Buyer Cases, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L.
259 (2011) (explaining how debt buyers take advantage of cursory procedural rules in small
claims court to obtain judgments against delinquent borrowers).
39. See ALBIN-LACKEY, supra note 37, at 1.
40. WARREN, supra note 15, at 12.
41. ALBIN-LACKEY, supra note 37, at 2.
42. See Kiel & Ernsthausen, supra note 33 (“In August [2020], Encore Capital, the largest
debt buyer in the country, announced that it had doubled its previous record for earnings in a
quarter.”).
43. Id.
44. See generally WARREN, supra note 15.
45. See id. at 8.
46. Id.
47. See Saunders & Tyler, supra note 33, at 51. See generally Conor P. Duffy, A Sum
Uncertain: Preserving Due Process and Preventing Default Judgments in Consumer Debt
Buyer Lawsuits in New York, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1147 (2013).
48. See supra Part I.A.
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discusses the interaction between debt collection and the availability of
consumer credit.
B. Garnishment and Consumer Financial Markets
This Note focuses on how creditors use courts to extract payment, namely
through a legal instrument called a garnishment. This section provides an
overview of how creditors use garnishment to collect debt and discusses the
role of debt collection in consumer financial markets.
State law provides both the substantive and procedural law of debt
collection.49 Accordingly, the remedies available to a creditor, including
garnishment, vary by state.50 Although the law varies, creditors51 must
generally meet several requirements before they are entitled to collect.52
First, a creditor must file a suit and obtain a judgment declaring that a
consumer owes a specific sum of money.53 Creditors, or more frequently
debt buyers, file millions of such actions in state court every year.54 More
than 70 percent of these cases result in a default judgment for the creditor,55
relieving the creditor of its burden to prove its entitlement to recover the
underlying debt.56
Once a creditor obtains a judgment, it may attempt to collect by garnishing
a debtor’s money or by levying (also called executing) the debtor’s
property.57 A levy or execution occurs when law enforcement seizes and
sells a debtor’s property, with the proceeds going to the creditor.58
Garnishment is a legal proceeding brought by a creditor against a third party
to obtain property of a debtor in the hands of the third party.59
Wage garnishment is a common type of garnishment used by creditors.60
Generally, wage garnishment permits a creditor to seize wages directly from
49. See LEVITIN, supra note 23, at 694.
50. See id.
51. This Note focuses only on unsecured debt, i.e., debt that is not secured by specific
collateral property of the debtor, like a car or home. See id. at 693–94.
52. See id. at 694–95.
53. Id. at 694. There are no self-help measures available to an unsecured creditor; they
may not take a debtor’s assets without a court order. Id.
54. See WARREN, supra note 15, at 8 (“From 1993 to 2013, the number of debt cases rose
from fewer than 1.7 million to about 4 million.”).
55. Id. at 2.
56. See Holland, supra note 38, at 263.
57. See LEVITIN, supra note 23, at 695. The specific procedures and names of the court
orders vary by state. Id.
58. Id.; see also Execution, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“Judicial
enforcement of a money judgment . . . by seizing and selling the judgment debtor’s
property . . . .”); Levy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The legally sanctioned
seizure and sale of property . . . .”).
59. See 30 AM. JUR. 2D Executions, Etc. § 464 (2022); LEVITIN, supra note 23, at 695;
Garnishment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“A judicial proceeding in which a
creditor (or potential creditor) asks the court to order a third party who is indebted to or is
bailee for the debtor to turn over to the creditor any of the debtor’s property (such as wages or
bank accounts) held by that third party.”).
60. Garnishment has deep historical roots dating back to the Middle Ages. See William E.
Mussman & Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Garnishment and Bankruptcy, 27 MINN L. REV. 1, 7–17
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a debtor’s employer.61 Once served with a notice of garnishment, an
employer withholds a certain percentage of an employee’s wages to satisfy
the debt.62 Every year, about eleven million workers have their paychecks
garnished in this way.63
Bank accounts may also be garnished to satisfy a debt.64 As of 2016,
98 percent of households had some type of deposit account.65 While terms
vary, banks generally have a duty to return to account holders up to the total
amount of the deposits.66 As a third party in possession of a debtor’s money,
a bank may be garnished to satisfy the debt of an account holder.67
Wage and bank account garnishment are essential tools that enable
creditors to collect on consumer debt and help facilitate the entire consumer
finance industry, which provides millions of Americans access to credit.68 In
order to provide such widespread credit, creditors must be able to collect on
outstanding debt.69 Burdensome collection laws, which increase the cost of
collection, are likely to result in higher interest rates for consumers and may
decrease the availability of credit overall, especially for high-risk
borrowers.70
However, if unrestrained, garnishment can lead to catastrophic results for
debtors.71 For example, in 2015, Anna, a teacher’s aide in Maryland, had
garnishment orders issued against both her employer and her bank, leaving
her nearly penniless.72 Without money, she was unable to pay her mortgage
and utility bills, leaving her without electricity and on the brink of
foreclosure.73 The stress of her financial situation was so profound that she
began to lose hair and had difficulty leaving the house due to crippling
anxiety and depression.74
(1942). Wage garnishment is a much newer practice that began in the industrial economy of
the nineteenth century soon after the abolishment of debtors’ prisons. See Boyd v.
Buckingham, 29 Tenn. (1 Hum.) 434, 435 (Tenn. 1850). Without the threat of imprisonment,
lawmakers feared that debtors would defy creditors by hiding assets. Id. Wage garnishment
laws reassured creditors by providing access to a laborer’s earnings in the hands of another.
Id.
61. See Willborn, supra note 20, at 853.
62. See id. at 851.
63. Id. at 848.
64. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
65. LEVITIN, supra note 23, at 265.
66. See id. at 264.
67. See generally infra Part II.A.1.
68. See LEVITIN, supra note 23, at 693.
69. Id.
70. See id.; see also Todd J. Zywicki, The Law and Economics of Consumer
Debt Collection and Its Regulation 3 (Sept. 2015) (unpublished manuscript),
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Zywicki-Debt-Collection-v2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QA52-737C].
71. See, e.g., supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text.
72. CAROLYN CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., NO FRESH START IN 2019: HOW STATES
STILL ALLOW DEBT COLLECTORS TO PUSH FAMILIES INTO POVERTY 13 (2019),
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/debt_collection/report-still-no-fresh-start-nov2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9YR2-BBNQ].
73. Id.
74. Id.
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Anna’s situation is far from unique. With so many Americans deep in debt
and unable to afford even a $400 expense,75 garnishment can have the effect
of pushing a debtor into destitution, depriving them of the ability to travel to
work or pay for necessities.76 These burdens are then passed on to the public
in the form of increased demand for social services.77 Moreover, lax
collection regulation can lead to predatory extensions of credit because
creditors can more easily extract repayment.78 Accordingly, in regulating
garnishment, the benefits of widespread commercial credit must be balanced
against the costs imposed on debtors and on the public by collection
practices.79
C. Federal and State Limitations on Garnishment
This section provides an overview of the major sources of garnishment
regulation. Part I.C.1 describes the Consumer Credit Protection Act, the
federal law limiting garnishment, and its interaction with state law. Part I.C.2
then introduces the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the federal
agency responsible for administering the nation’s consumer protection laws.
1. The Consumer Credit Protection Act and the States
Garnishment is regulated at both the federal and state level.80 At the
federal level, the CCPA limits wage garnishment to 25 percent of a worker’s
weekly wages.81 However, the CCPA preserves the ability of states to enact
garnishment laws that offer greater protection to debtors.82 Moreover, the
CCPA has been narrowly construed to allow creditors to seize 100 percent of
wages once they are deposited into a bank account.83 Accordingly, state law
continues to play a critical role in defining the level of protection afforded to
debtors. This section provides an overview of the CCPA’s enactment and
describes the law’s limitations on garnishment, as well as its interaction with
state statutes.
The CCPA was enacted against a backdrop of rapidly increasing personal
bankruptcies. Over a roughly twenty-year period, the amount in consumer
credit had increased from $5.6 billion in 1945 to over ninety-five billion
dollars in 1967.84 During that same period, the yearly number of personal

75. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
76. See CARTER, supra note 72, at 8.
77. See id.; cf. Stratton v. Travis, 380 A.2d 985, 986 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977) (“The
exemption statutes in effect in America today are rooted in the early English Common Law
and based on the humane theory that by allowing the debtor to retain certain property he has
an opportunity to be self-supporting and thus will not become a burden on society.”).
78. See 15 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (“The unrestricted garnishment of compensation due for
personal services encourages the making of predatory extensions of credit.”).
79. See LEVITIN, supra note 23, at 693.
80. See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text.
81. 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a).
82. Id. § 1677.
83. See infra Part II.A.1.
84. H.R. REP. NO. 90-1040, at 10 (1967).
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bankruptcies increased from 18,000 to 208,000.85 Congress viewed the
“unrestricted garnishment of compensation due for personal services”86 as
“the greatest single pressure . . . forcing wage earners into bankruptcies.”87
The legislative history notes that the evidence “clearly established a causal
connection between harsh garnishment laws and high levels of personal
bankruptcies.”88 For example, the House report for the bill found the rate of
personal bankruptcies in states that prohibited wage garnishment to be at
about seven per 100,000 citizens.89 In states with harsh garnishment laws,
that rate soared to roughly 250 per 100,000 citizens.90
To address the rise in personal bankruptcies, Congress enacted the
Consumer Credit Protection Act. The CCPA’s provisions on wage
garnishment limit the amount of an employee’s disposable earnings that may
be garnished to satisfy a debt.91 At a minimum, the law exempts all weekly
wages below thirty times the federal minimum wage from garnishment.92
Accordingly, today, a worker making less than $217.50 per week may not
have any of their wages garnished.93 For workers making more than $217.50
per week, wage garnishment may never exceed 25 percent of the worker’s
disposable earnings.94 Finally, the law prohibits an employer from
discharging any employee because “[the employee’s] earnings have been
subjected to garnishment for any one indebtedness.”95
Bringing uniformity to garnishment law was a key purpose of the CCPA.96
However, the CCPA did not entirely replace state law. It contains an
anti-preemption provision that preserves state laws that offer at least as much
protection to debtors as the CCPA.97 In the wake of the CCPA’s enactment,
many states revised their wage garnishment statutes to mirror the language
of the federal law.98
85. Id. at 20.
86. 15 U.S.C. § 1671.
87. H.R. REP. NO. 90-1040, at 7 (1967).
88. Id. at 20–21.
89. Id. at 21.
90. Id.
91. 15 U.S.C. § 1673.
92. Id. (“[T]he maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of an individual for
any workweek which is subjected to garnishment may not exceed (1) 25 per centum of his
disposable earnings for that week, or (2) the amount by which his disposable earnings for that
week exceed thirty times the Federal minimum hourly wage . . . whichever is less.”).
93. Willborn, supra note 20, at 852 n.28.
94. 15 U.S.C. § 1673.
95. Id. § 1674.
96. See id. § 1671(a)(3) (“The great disparities among the laws of the several States
relating to garnishment have, in effect, destroyed the uniformity of the bankruptcy laws and
frustrated the purposes thereof in many areas of the country.”).
97. Id. § 1677; see also Willborn, supra note 20, at 852.
98. See Jason C. Walker, Wyoming’s Statutory Exemption on Wage Garnishment: Should
It Include Deposited Wages?, 6 WYO. L. REV. 53, 57 (2006); see also Brown v.
Commonwealth, 40 S.W.3d 873, 876 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999) (“[The CCPA] requires state
garnishment exemption statutes to comply with federal limitations on amounts that may be
garnished. Consequently, most state wage garnishment exemption statutes, including
Kentucky’s, track the language of the federal act.”).
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The CCPA’s anti-preemption provision has resulted in a range of
protection for debtors at the state level.99 Many, but not all, have enacted
laws protecting a greater portion of a debtor’s paycheck than the federal law
does, with four states banning the practice of wage garnishment outright.100
However, many states do not go beyond the CCPA, permitting wage
garnishment to the same degree that federal law does.101
The CCPA’s regulation of wage garnishment has been limited in one
important respect. As discussed in Part II.A, shortly after its enactment,
courts narrowly construed the CCPA’s provisions to apply only to
garnishments of an employer, allowing creditors to seize 100 percent of
wages once they are deposited into a bank account.102 Due to this narrow
interpretation, the regulation of bank account garnishment has been entirely
left to the states, and thus outside the scope of the CCPA.103
States vary greatly in the level of protection afforded to bank accounts.104
Some states limit the amount a creditor may take.105 For example, in New
York, the first $3,600 in an account is automatically protected.106 On the
other hand, fourteen states offer no protection to a debtor’s bank account,
allowing creditors unrestricted access to a debtor’s deposited wages.107
In conclusion, the CCPA currently plays a limited role in regulating wage
garnishment.108 While it effectively serves as a floor of protection,
preserving at least 75 percent of a worker’s paycheck while in the possession
of an employer, it has been narrowly construed to permit creditors unfettered
access to a debtor’s bank account.109 Although some states have taken steps
to protect bank accounts, millions of Americans live in jurisdictions without
such additional protections.110 Debtors in these states that receive wages
through direct deposit essentially enjoy no protection from unrestricted wage
garnishment, despite the CCPA’s provisions.111

99. See generally CARTER, supra note 72.
100. Id. at 9.
101. Id.
102. See infra Part II.A.1.
103. See CARTER, supra note 72, at 6, 24.
104. Id. at 24.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 26. Delaware offers the strongest protection to debtors by banning bank account
garnishments outright. Id. at 30. Maine, Nevada, New York, North Dakota, South Carolina,
and Wisconsin all allow debtors to protect a minimum amount in a bank account from
garnishment. Id.
107. Id. at 30 (explaining that Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Michigan, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Wyoming, and the Virgin
Islands do not protect bank accounts from garnishment).
108. See supra notes 99–107 and accompanying text.
109. See infra Part II.A.1.
110. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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2. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
The CCPA is not the only federal law that may provide relief from
unrestricted wage garnishment. The Consumer Financial Protection Act,
enacted in 2010 in the wake of the 2008 Great Recession, established the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, a federal agency responsible for
administering the nation’s consumer protection laws.112 The CFPB does not
currently regulate garnishment. However, pursuant to its statutory authority,
the bureau may engage in rulemaking and bring enforcement actions to
prohibit unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts and practices (UDAAP).113
Subsequent parts of this Note will explore prior regulatory actions by the
CFPB invoking these powers to better illustrate the extent of the CFPB’s
UDAAP authority.114 Ultimately, this Note will argue that the CFPB should
enact rules limiting bank account garnishment.115 This section focuses on
the CFPB’s rulemaking authority and describes the statutory definitions of
unfair and abusive acts and practices.116
The CFPA empowers the CFPB to prohibit a covered person from
engaging in unfair acts or practices in connection with any consumer
financial product or service.117 The “unfair acts or practices” standard is
comprised of three elements.118 First, the act must “cause[] or [be] likely to
cause substantial injury to consumers.”119 Second, the injury caused by a
purported unfair practice must “not [be] reasonably avoidable by
consumers.”120
Finally, the injury must not be “outweighed by
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.”121
The CFPB also has authority to prescribe rules that identify and prohibit
“abusive acts or practices.”122 The statute provides four types of abusive acts

112. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, BUILDING THE CFPB: A PROGRESS REPORT 8 (2011),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2011/07/Report_BuildingTheCfpb1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3H8Z-US65].
113. 12 U.S.C. § 5531 (granting the CFPB rulemaking authority to identify UDAAPs);
id. § 5536 (designating UDAAPs as unlawful).
114. See infra Part II.B.
115. See infra Part III.B.
116. The CFPB has power to limit unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts and practices. See
supra note 113 and accompanying text. I refer to this interchangeably as the bureau’s
“UDAAP power” or “UDAAP authority.” Each adjective—unfair, deceptive, or abusive—is
treated distinctly under the act. See 12 U.S.C. § 5531. The “deceptive” element is not
discussed as it is not relevant to this Note. See generally LEVITIN, supra note 23, at 193–201
(providing an overview of the “deceptive” element).
117. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(b).
118. Id. § 5531(c); see also Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment
Loans, 82 Fed. Reg. 54472, 54519 (Nov. 22, 2017) (“[T]he unfairness standard . . . requires
primary consideration of three elements: The presence of a substantial injury, the absence of
consumers’ ability to reasonably avoid the injury, and the countervailing benefits to consumers
or to competition associated with the act or practice.”).
119. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c)(1)(A).
120. Id.
121. Id. § 5531(c)(1)(B).
122. Id. § 5531(b).
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or practices.123 First, an act is abusive if it “materially interferes with the
ability of a consumer to understand a term or condition” of a financial
product.124 Abusive acts are also those that take unreasonable advantage of
(1) a consumer’s lack of understanding of a material risk of a financial
product, (2) a consumer’s inability to protect their interests, or (3) a
consumer’s reasonable reliance on a covered person to act in their best
interest.125
Despite the potential reach, the CFPB has rarely invoked its UDAAP
authority in rulemaking and enforcement actions.126 To date, the CFPB has
promulgated only a single rule prohibiting an unfair and abusive practice.127
The “abusive” standard is especially enigmatic.128 Of a total 200
enforcement actions brought as of the start of 2018, only twenty-seven had
“abusive” counts.129 To date, not a single court has interpreted the “abusive”
provision.130 Accordingly, the statutory text and the CFPB’s enforcement
actions provide the only authoritative commentary on the meaning of the
“abusive” provision.131
Part II.B will build on the statutory provisions detailed here and provide
illustrations of how the CFPB has used its rulemaking and enforcement
powers in practice.
II. CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW AND BANK ACCOUNT GARNISHMENT
The limited application of the CCPA to bank accounts has left a void in
the regulation of wage garnishment.132 Today, millions of Americans are
vulnerable to the seizure of their deposited wages, despite the federal law’s
garnishment limitations.133 This part explores how the CCPA and the CFPB
might limit bank account garnishment. Part II.A details the conflicting
interpretations of the CCPA’s garnishment provisions, describing how courts
have reached varying conclusions on the law’s application to deposited
wages. Part II.B then shifts gears to discuss the CFPB’s UDAAP powers,
providing examples of how the bureau has previously limited unfair and
abusive acts and practices that are similar to bank account garnishment. The
issues presented in Part II will ultimately be resolved in Part III, where this
Note argues that the CCPA should be enforced to limit bank account
garnishment and advocates for the CFPB to engage in regulatory action to
protect a minimum balance in a bank account from garnishment.

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. § 5531(d).
Id. § 5531(d)(1).
Id. § 5531(d)(2).
See LEVITIN, supra note 23, at 188.
See id.
See id. at 206.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part I.C.1.
See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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A. Conflicting Approaches: The CCPA and Bank Account Garnishment
Shortly after the CCPA’s enactment, litigation ensued to determine
whether the CCPA applied to wages deposited into a bank account.134 The
overwhelming weight of authority holds that the CCPA does not apply to
banks, allowing creditors unfettered access to an employee’s wages once
deposited.135 However, courts are not unanimous in this interpretation.136
Several state courts, interpreting nearly identical state statutes modeled on
the CCPA, have held that the law applies to all garnishments, whether issued
to a bank or an employer.137
This section examines how courts have reached conflicting conclusions on
this issue. Part II.A.1 looks at interpretations that limit the CCPA’s
application to employers. Part II.A.2 then describes state court decisions
protecting bank accounts. Finally, Part II.A.3 examines the treatment of
federal laws that are similar to the CCPA.
1. The CCPA’s Limited Application to Bank Accounts
Courts have generally held that the CCPA’s garnishment provisions apply
only in the employment context, and not to wages deposited into a bank
account.138 The statute itself is silent on this issue, but courts have rejected
extending the act’s protections—which limit the amount of weekly wages a
creditor may garnish—to the lump sum reflected in a debtor’s bank
account.139 This section describes how courts have interpreted the CCPA’s
statutory language, legislative history, and precedent to reject applying the
CCPA to wages deposited in bank accounts.
Courts have generally determined that the CCPA’s silence regarding its
application to nonemployer garnishees, specifically banks, demonstrates a
congressional intent to exclude such institutions from the act’s provisions.140
134. See, e.g., Usery v. First Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 586 F.2d 107 (9th Cir. 1978); Dunlop v.
First Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 399 F. Supp. 855 (D. Ariz. 1975).
135. See Usery, 586 F.2d at 108; United States v. Tilford, No. 13-CV-3906-N, 2014 WL
11048791, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2014) (finding that “nothing in the CCPA restricts the
garnishment of funds once deposited in a bank account”); United States v. Tisdale, No.
12-CV-5250-L, 2013 WL 4804286, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2013) (“[O]nce earnings are
deposited into an account, those funds are no longer characterized as ‘earnings’ and therefore
lose the 25 percent exemption.”); In re Lawrence, 205 B.R. 115, 123 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1997)
(“[A]lmost all the cases interpreting the CCPA, both state and federal, have held that the
federal statute does not prevent creditors from pursuing earnings once they are in the hands of
the debtor.”); Dunlop, 399 F. Supp. at 858; Brown v. Commonwealth, 40 S.W.3d 873, 877
(Ky. Ct. App. 1999) (“In light of the CCPA’s limited purpose, virtually all of the courts to
consider whether that act applies to wages deposited into bank accounts or otherwise removed
from the employer’s control have found that it does not.”).
136. See infra Part II.A.2.
137. See infra Part II.A.2.
138. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
139. See infra notes 150–53 and accompanying text.
140. See Usery, 586 F.2d at 110 (“It is unrealistic to assume that Congress intended to
impose such duties without mentioning banks or financial institutions in this title of the statute
or without conducting any hearings that would give financial institutions fair warning that they
were subject to such obligations.”); Dunlop, 399 F. Supp. at 857 (“If Congress . . . had
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For example, in Dunlop v. First National Bank of Arizona,141 the first case
to address this issue,142 the court found that by omitting reference to banks,
Congress intended to exclude them from the act’s coverage.143 The court
found that a statute’s individual sections must be read in relation to the whole
act.144 The court noted that the CCPA explicitly addresses financial
institutions in other sections and held that because Congress has specifically
used a term (e.g., “financial institutions”) in certain places and excluded it in
others, the court should not read that term into the excluded section.145
Accordingly, the court held that the CCPA offers no protection to deposited
wages.146
Similarly, the CCPA’s extensive legislative history is devoid of any
mention of banks.147 In Usery v. First National Bank of Arizona,148 the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found it “unrealistic” that Congress
would impose a duty on banks to protect a depositor’s wages without
conducting hearings on the matter, especially because financial institutions
provided extensive testimony regarding other sections of the CCPA.149
Moreover, it is unclear how the act’s garnishment limitations could be
applied to deposited wages.150 The act limits garnishment in reference to
weekly earnings, a figure potentially unknown to banks and which “bear[s]
no relation to the lump sum amount in a checking or savings account.”151
Applying the act to bank accounts raises a number of unanswered
administrative questions, like how long to exempt wages for or how to treat
wages commingled with other, nonexempt monies.152 These administrative
concerns, along with the act’s explicit application to wages, suggest that the
act may only protect earnings throughout the payroll process.153
Instead of limiting garnishment, courts have found that the principal
concern of the act is the preservation of the employer-employee

intended that it apply to such a large grouping of economic institutions it would have so
stated . . . .”); John O. Melby & Co. Bank v. Anderson, 276 N.W.2d 274, 277 (Wis. 1979).
141. 399 F. Supp. 855 (D. Ariz. 1975).
142. Id. at 857.
143. See id. at 856.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 858.
147. Id. at 856. (“After a careful reading of the Congressional reports and debate on the
subchapter and the briefs submitted by the Bank and the Department one fact emerges. There
is no mention of financial institutions in reference to Subchapter II.”).
148. 586 F.2d 107 (9th Cir. 1978).
149. Id. at 110.
150. See id. at 109.
151. Id. The court also emphasized that the act “contains no suggestion as to how a bank
could acquire such information or maintain records without impinging upon the privacy of its
depositors.” Id.
152. Id.
153. See John O. Melby & Co. Bank v. Anderson, 276 N.W.2d 274, 277–78 (Wis. 1979)
(“It could not be clearer that the Congress was concerned with the protection of earnings in
the ordinary payroll process. There is nothing to suggest that the restrictions on garnishment
were intended to apply to wages after they had been paid over to the worker.”).
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relationship.154 Indeed, the congressional declaration of purpose indicates
that “[t]he application of garnishment as a creditors’ remedy frequently
results in loss of employment by the debtor.”155 Moreover, the act proscribes
terminating an employee when they are subjected to a single garnishment.156
In Usery, the court found that the purpose of preserving employment would
not be served if the act were extended to banks, as a bank has no bearing on
the employer-employee relationship.157
Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Kokoszka v. Belford158
suggests that deposited funds may be beyond the contemplation of the
CCPA.159 In Kokoszka, the only Supreme Court case to consider the
garnishment provisions of the CCPA, the Court held that an income tax
refund does not constitute “earnings” within the meaning of the statute.160
The Kokoszka Court found that Congress intended to regulate “garnishment
in its usual sense as a levy on periodic payments of compensation needed to
support the wage earner and his family on a week-to-week, month-to-month
basis,” and did not protect “every asset that is traceable in some way to such
compensation.”161 Courts have applied this logic to deny protections for
deposited funds because, “[l]ike a lump sum tax return, a bank account has
neither an element of periodicity nor the critical relationship to a person’s
subsistence that a paycheck does.”162 Under this interpretation, once wages
are deposited, they lose the character of “earnings” and are therefore no
longer within the ambit of the CCPA’s garnishment protections.163
In sum, courts have narrowly construed the CCPA to apply only to
garnishments of an employer.164 Accordingly, wages deposited into a bank
account enjoy none of the CCPA’s protections.165 However, courts are not
unanimous in this interpretation.166 Next, Part II.A.2 discusses how state
courts have interpreted statutes modeled on the CCPA to protect deposited
funds.
154. See Usery, 586 F.2d at 110; Dunlop v. First Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 399 F. Supp. 855,
856 (D. Ariz. 1975) (“The purpose of Subchapter II is to govern the relationship between
employers and employees.”); Brown v. Commonwealth, 40 S.W.3d 873, 877 (Ky. Ct. App.
1999) (“These [garnishment] provisions were not intended to create a new fund beyond the
reach of creditors, but only to prevent creditors from unduly burdening the employment
relationship.”).
155. 15 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(2).
156. Id. § 1674(a).
157. Usery, 586 F.2d at 110.
158. 417 U.S. 642 (1974).
159. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
160. Kokoszka, 417 U.S. at 651.
161. Id.
162. Usery, 586 F.2d at 110.
163. John O. Melby & Co. Bank v. Anderson, 276 N.W.2d 274, 278 (Wis. 1979) (“While
it is clear that an income-tax refund is derived from earnings, it is equally clear that it is not . . .
payroll earnings . . . . It is also clear that bank accounts, although resulting from a deposit of
the employee’s payroll check, are not ‘disposable earnings’ sought to be protected by the
Act . . . .”); see also Hodge v. Sinclair (In re Sinclair), 417 F.3d 527, 531 (5th Cir. 2005).
164. See supra notes 150–53.
165. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
166. See infra Part II.A.2.
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2. Exemption of Deposited Wages Under State CCPA Analogues
After the CCPA’s enactment, many states modified their existing
garnishment laws to mirror the language of the CCPA.167 So long as these
laws provide at least as much protection as the CCPA, they are not preempted
by the federal statute.168 In interpreting state statutes modeled after the
CCPA, some state courts have held that their analogous provisions apply not
only to employers, but also to deposited wages.169 This section illustrates
how some high state courts have looked to precedent and legislative purpose
to protect bank accounts from unrestrained garnishment.
In MidAmerica Savings Bank v. Miehe,170 the Iowa Supreme Court held
that Iowa’s garnishment statute protects wages deposited into a bank
account.171 The Iowa garnishment statute is nearly identical to the CCPA
and provides that “[t]he disposable earnings of an individual are exempt from
garnishment to the extent provided by the federal Consumer Credit
Protection Act.”172 Although the Iowa law is, by its terms, coextensive with
the CCPA, the Iowa court looked to state precedent and the purpose of the
garnishment law to afford Iowans greater protections than those provided
under the prevailing interpretation of the CCPA.173
In 1930, before the enactment of the CCPA, the Iowa Supreme Court
considered whether the state’s garnishment statute, which at the time
exempted personal earnings from garnishment,174 protected wages deposited
into a bank.175 In Staton v. Vernon,176 the court found that it would be an
“unreasonable construction” to consider the character of earnings to be
transformed simply by depositing them into a bank.177 Accordingly, the
court held that depositing wages does not “change the character of the
earnings as to deprive them of their exempt character” and protected the
deposits from garnishment.178
In MidAmerica, the court found that the rationale of Staton is “as valid
today as it was in 1930.”179 The court reasoned that if exempted wages could
be garnished immediately upon deposit, then the purpose of the law would
167. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text.
169. See Morrison v. Kobernusz (In re Kobernusz), 160 B.R. 844 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1993);
Miller v. Monrean, 507 P.2d 771 (Alaska 1973); MidAmerica Sav. Bank v. Miehe, 438
N.W.2d 837 (Iowa 1989); Daugherty v. Cent. Tr. Co. of N.E. Ohio, 504 N.E.2d 1100 (Ohio
1986).
170. 438 N.W.2d 837 (Iowa 1989).
171. Id. at 838.
172. IOWA CODE ANN. § 642.21 (West 2022).
173. See MidAmerica, 438 N.W.2d at 838.
174. Iowa law provided that “[t]he earnings of a debtor . . . for his personal services . . . are
exempt from liability for debt.” MidAmerica, 438 at 839 (quoting IOWA CODE § 11763 (1939);
IOWA CODE § 11763 (1927)).
175. See Staton v. Vernon, 229 N.W. 763, 764 (Iowa 1930).
176. 229 N.W. 763 (Iowa 1930).
177. Id. at 764.
178. Id.
179. MidAmerica, 438 N.W.2d at 839.
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be “rendered meaningless.”180 Furthermore, the court noted that the
“commercial realities of modern-day living” frequently require wages to be
deposited into a bank and ruled that a debtor must have a “reasonable
opportunity” to spend a paycheck before it may be garnished by a creditor.181
Accordingly, the court exempted all wages deposited within ninety days of a
garnishment order.182
Colorado’s exemption law has been interpreted similarly. Prior to the
CCPA, Colorado law provided that “[t]here shall be exempt from levy under
execution or attachment or garnishment the wages and earnings of any debtor
to an amount not exceeding one hundred dollars, earned during the thirty
days next preceding such levy.”183 In 1891, the Colorado Supreme Court
held that this statute protected earnings deposited into a bank account.184 In
Rutter v. Shumway,185 the court found that “if earnings once received
immediately lose their character as wages, then . . . the laborer could never
retain his earnings for a single hour without exposing them to the very perils
which the statute was designed to avert.”186 The court found the argument
that wages could be garnished upon deposit to be a “mockery.”187
A little over one hundred years after Rutter, this same issue reemerged in
Morrison v. Kobernusz (In re Kobernusz).188 By that time, the Colorado
garnishment statute had been amended to conform with the CCPA.189
Relying on Dunlop and Usery,190 the plaintiff-creditor argued that the
defendant-debtor could not shield wages from garnishment after deposit.191
The court acknowledged that if “this case hinged on an interpretation of the
CCPA, then Usery would be compelling precedent.”192 However, because
the defendant chose to rely on Colorado law, the court rejected plaintiff’s
argument.193 Citing Rutter, the court found that it would be “absurd and
improper” to argue that earnings “lose . . . exemption when placed into a
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 840.
183. Rutter v. Shumway, 26 P. 321, 322 (Colo. 1891) (quoting 1885 Colo. Sess. Laws 262).
184. See id.
185. 26 P. 321 (Colo. 1891).
186. Id. at 322.
187. Id.
188. 160 B.R. 844 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1993).
189. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a) (“[T]he maximum part of the aggregate disposable
earnings of an individual for any workweek which is subjected to garnishment may not exceed
(1) 25 per centum of his disposable earnings for that week, or (2) the amount by which his
disposable earnings for that week exceed thirty times the Federal minimum hourly
wage . . . .”), with COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-54-104(2)(a)(I)(A) (West 2022) (“[T]he
maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of an individual for any workweek that is
subjected to garnishment or levy under execution or attachment may not exceed . . . the lesser
of: (A) Twenty percent of the individual’s disposable earnings for that week; or (B) The
amount by which the individual’s disposable earnings for that week exceed forty times the
federal minimum hourly wage . . . .”).
190. See supra notes 141–57 and accompanying text.
191. In re Kobernusz, 160 B.R. at 847.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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wallet” and reaffirmed that Colorado’s exemption law extends to deposited
wages.194
Iowa and Colorado are not alone.195 The high courts of Alaska and Ohio
have similarly interpreted their respective state CCPA analogues to exempt
wages after deposit.196 As with In re Kobernusz and MidAmerica, both
courts emphasized that the garnishment of deposited wages undermines the
essential purpose of an exemption law.197 However, because these cases
concern state CCPA analogues, these decisions do not alter the prevailing
interpretations of the CCPA discussed in Part II.A.1. For debtors living in
jurisdictions without state limitations on garnishment, the CCPA offers no
protection for deposited paychecks.198
The following section explores how courts have addressed this issue in the
context of federal benefits. Certain federal benefits, like social security
insurance, may not be garnished.199 But, as with wages, creditors have
attempted to garnish bank accounts containing these exempt benefits by
arguing that the exemption is lost upon deposit.200 The next section discusses
the U.S. Supreme Court’s rejection of this position and describes why courts
have not extended the same protection to wages.
3. Garnishment of Deposited Federal Benefits
The U.S. Supreme Court has twice considered the question of whether
money remains exempt after deposit in the context of veterans’ and social
security benefits.201 In both instances, the Court held that the funds remained
exempt after deposit.202 This section describes these holdings and explores
why courts have not extended the same treatment to a debtor’s deposited
wages.
In Porter v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,203 the Court held that deposited
veterans’ benefits remain exempt, provided the money is readily available to
support the veteran and has not been converted into permanent
194. Id. at 848 (“[Rutter] stressed that wages should not lose [exemption] solely on the
basis of being placed into a bank account . . . . Though one hundred and two years old, the
[Rutter] decision is still applicable and controlling.”).
195. See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
196. See Miller v. Monrean, 507 P.2d 771 (Alaska 1973); Daugherty v. Cent. Tr. Co. of
N.E. Ohio, 504 N.E.2d 1100 (Ohio 1986).
197. See Daugherty, 504 N.E.2d at 1103 (“The legislature’s purpose, in exempting certain
property from court action brought by creditors, was to protect funds intended primarily for
maintenance and support of the debtor’s family. This legislative intent would be frustrated if
exempt funds were automatically deprived of their statutory immunity when deposited in a
checking account . . . .” (citation omitted)); Miller, 507 P.2d at 775 (“The primary purpose of
[the law] is to allow the judgment debtor to retain a portion of his income to meet his family
needs. In light of this purpose, it would be anomalous to limit the protections of [the law] to
income in the hands of the employer.”).
198. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
199. See infra Part II.A.3.
200. See, e.g., infra notes 207–15 and accompanying text.
201. See infra notes 203, 207.
202. See infra notes 206, 215 and accompanying text.
203. 370 U.S. 159 (1962).
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investments.204 The statute states that veterans’ benefits “shall be exempt
from the claim of creditors, and shall not be liable to attachment, levy, or
seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or
after receipt by the beneficiary.”205 The Court found that, because exemption
statutes should be construed liberally to protect the maintenance and support
of debtors, deposits of veterans’ benefits should “remain inviolate.”206
Similarly, in Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Board,207 the Court
exempted deposited federal disability benefits from seizure.208 In Philpott,
a New Jersey man was allowed to collect state disability benefits on the
condition that he reimburse the state should he receive any federal aid.209
One year after he began to receive state benefits, the petitioner received a
retroactive, lump-sum disability insurance payment under the Social Security
Act210 amounting to nearly $2,000.211 New Jersey sued to seize the funds
from the petitioner’s bank pursuant to the reimbursement agreement.212
The Social Security Act provides that “none of the moneys paid or payable
or rights existing under this subchapter shall be subject to execution, levy,
attachment, garnishment, or other legal process.”213 The Court found that
the retroactive payment was “moneys paid” within the meaning of the act,
and that the state’s suit was an “execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or
other legal process.”214 The Court analogized the facts to the facts in Porter
and held that the “funds on deposit were readily withdrawable and retained
the quality of ‘moneys’ within the purview of [the Social Security Act].”215
However, courts have found that Porter and Philpott support a contrary
result when applied to the exemption of wages under the CCPA.216 For
example, the statute at issue in Porter explicitly protects veterans’ benefits
“either before or after receipt by the beneficiary.”217 In Usery, the Ninth
Circuit found that, had Congress wanted to afford the same protection for
wages, it “would have chosen similar unequivocal terms.” 218 Similarly, the
Social Security Act provides protection against “execution, levy, attachment,
garnishment, or other legal process.”219 Courts have found that, had
Congress intended to protect wages in the hands of an employee, it would
204. See id. at 162.
205. Id. at 159 n.1 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 3101(a) (1964)).
206. Id. at 162.
207. 409 U.S. 413 (1973).
208. See id. at 417.
209. See id. at 413–14.
210. Ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
211. Philpott, 409 U.S. at 415.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 415 n.3 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 407(a)).
214. Id. at 416.
215. Id.
216. See Usery v. First Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 586 F.2d 107, 111 (9th Cir. 1978); Dunlop v.
First Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 399 F. Supp. 855, 857 (D. Ariz. 1975); John O. Melby & Co. Bank
v. Anderson, 276 N.W.2d 274, 279 (Wis. 1979).
217. 38 U.S.C. § 3101(a) (1964).
218. Usery, 586 F.2d at 111.
219. 42 U.S.C. § 407(a).
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have provided for protection against “attachment of such monies while in the
hands of the employee, as they did in the case of social security benefits.”220
In conclusion, Part II.A has discussed the conflicting approaches to
protecting deposited funds from garnishment under the CCPA and similar
statutes. Although some state courts differ, the weight of authority maintains
that wages may be garnished after deposit.221 Similarly, the Supreme Court’s
exemption of deposited federal benefits, discussed in this section, has been
construed to support a contrary outcome for deposited wages.222 This Note
returns to these issues in Part III.A, where it argues that the CCPA’s
limitations should be applied to deposited wages.
Next, this Note explores an alternative approach to limiting bank account
garnishment under the regulatory authority of the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau. To illustrate the bureau’s authority to limit unfair and
abusive practices, Part II.B overviews the bureau’s prior rulemaking and
enforcement actions. Ultimately, Part III.B will illustrate how the authority
discussed in the following section can be used to rein in unrestrained bank
account garnishment.
B. “Unfair and Abusive” in CFPB Rulemaking and Enforcement Actions
The CCPA is not the only federal law that may limit bank account
garnishment.223 As discussed in Part I.C.2, the CFPB has rulemaking
authority to prohibit unfair and abusive acts and practices.224 This section
illustrates how the CFPB has used this authority in prior rulemaking and
enforcement actions. Part II.B.1 describes the CFPB’s Payday, Vehicle Title,
and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans rule225 (the “Payday Lending
Rule”), the only rule to date to invoke the bureau’s UDAAP authority.226
Part II.B.2 then illustrates how the “unfair and abusive” standard have been
used in prior CFPB enforcement actions.
1. “Unfair and Abusive” in CFPB Rulemaking
In 2017, the CFPB promulgated the Payday Lending Rule, the first and
only rule invoking its UDAAP authority.227 This rule limits a payday
lender’s ability to seize funds from a borrower’s bank account in satisfaction
of a payday loan.228 By targeting a lender’s unrestricted access to a bank
account as an unfair and abusive practice in the payday lending context, the
220. Usery, 586 F.2d at 111; see also Dunlop, 399 F. Supp. at 857 (“The Court feels that . . .
[the Social Security Act] expresses a concern on the part of the Congress to protect a given
fund from all methods of attachment. On the other hand . . . [the CCPA] is concerned with
the regulation of the garnishment process itself and not the protection of a given fund.”).
221. See supra Parts II.A–B.
222. See supra Part II.C.
223. See infra Part III.B.
224. See supra Part I.C.2.
225. 12 C.F.R. § 1014 (2021).
226. See supra notes 126–27.
227. See supra notes 126–27.
228. See infra note 235 and accompanying text.
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Payday Lending Rule serves as a potential model for how the CFPB can
regulate bank account garnishment more generally, a theme to be developed
in Part III of this Note. This section illustrates how the CFPB used its
UDAAP authority to limit the ability of payday lenders to seize bank
accounts.
The Payday Lending Rule regulates how lenders collect payday loans,
which are short-term loans that are generally required to be repaid in a single
lump-sum payment on a borrower’s next payday.229 Prior to the
promulgation of the rule, borrowers were typically required to authorize
future third-party withdrawals from their bank accounts to ensure loan
repayment.230 In the event of default, lenders used these prior authorizations
to access a borrower’s account to recoup the loan.231
However, borrowers often lacked sufficient funds to cover the full amount
of the pre-authorized withdrawal.232 Despite the initial failure, lenders would
repeatedly attempt to make withdrawals.233 Each failed attempt would
generate multiple new fees for the distressed borrower, assessed by both the
lender and the bank.234
The Payday Lending Rule specifically targets these repeated collection
attempts as an unfair and abusive practice.235 The rule prohibits lenders from
making new withdrawal attempts after two consecutive payment attempts
have failed, unless the consumer provides a fresh authorization to do so.236
The CFPB found that unlimited collection attempts on payday loans were
unfair within the meaning of the CFPA.237 The “unfair acts or practices”
standard is comprised of three elements238: First, the act must “cause[] or
[be] likely to cause substantial injury to consumers.”239 Second, the injury
caused by a purported unfair practice must “not [be] reasonably avoidable by

229. See Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 82 Fed. Reg.
54472, 54475 (Nov. 17, 2017).
230. See id. at 54499.
231. See id. at 54500.
232. See id. (“[O]ver an eighteen-month observation period, 50% of online borrowers were
found to experience at least one payment attempt that failed or caused an overdraft and
one-third of the borrowers experienced more than one such incident.”).
233. See id. at 54573 (“The Bureau’s research indicates that when one attempt fails, online
payday lenders make a second attempt to collect 75 percent of the time but are unsuccessful
in 70 percent of those cases. The failure rate increases with each subsequent attempt.”).
234. See id. (“The median bank fee for an NSF transaction is $34.00 . . . . In addition to
incurring NSF fees from a bank . . . the consumer can be charged a returned check fee by the
lender . . . [resulting in] duplicative and additional fees for the same failed transaction.”).
235. 12 C.F.R. § 1041.7 (2021) (“It is an unfair and abusive practice for a lender to make
attempts to withdraw payment from consumers’ accounts . . . after the lender’s second
consecutive attempts to withdraw payments . . . have failed due to a lack of sufficient funds,
unless the lender obtains the consumers’ new and specific authorization . . . .”).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
239. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c)(1)(A).
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consumers.”240
Finally, the injury must not be “outweighed by
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.”241
On the first prong, the CFPB determined that unlimited collection attempts
cause substantial injury to consumers by generating excessive fees and by
increasing the risk of account closure.242 The rule notes that 43 percent of
accounts with two consecutive failed withdrawal attempts are closed by the
depository institution, compared to only 3 percent of accounts generally.243
Such an increased risk of account closure, along with the cumulative fees
owed to both the bank and lender, were sufficient to establish substantial
injury to consumers.244
The CFPB also determined that consumers were not able to reasonably
avoid the substantial injury caused by successive withdrawal attempts.245
The rule notes that consumers often face difficulty revoking withdrawal
authorizations or stopping payments to lenders.246 The bureau determined
that voluntarily closing an account to prevent withdrawals was not reasonable
because “consumers use their accounts to conduct most of their household
financial transactions.”247 Repaying or avoiding the loan in the first place
was also found to not be a reasonable means of avoiding the injury.248
Finally, the bureau determined that the injury caused by successive
withdrawal attempts was not outweighed by countervailing benefits to the
consumer or competition.249 The rule notes that the exceedingly low success
rates of repeated withdrawal attempts are of little benefit to lenders and
impose onerous costs on already distressed borrowers.250
The bureau also found repeated withdrawal attempts by payday lenders to
be “abusive” in violation of the CFPA.251 The statute designates four types
of abusive acts or practices.252 First, an act is abusive if it “materially
interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand a term or condition”
of a financial product.253 Abusive acts are also those that take unreasonable
advantage of (1) a consumer’s lack of understanding of a material risk of a
financial product, (2) a consumer’s inability to protect their interests, or
240. Id.
241. Id. § 5531(c)(1)(B).
242. See Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 82 Fed. Reg.
54472, 54734 (Nov. 17, 2017).
243. Id.
244. See id. at 54733.
245. See id. at 54736.
246. See id.
247. Id.
248. See id. at 54737. As one court noted, if avoiding or repaying a loan were seen as a
reasonable protective measure, then “[b]y that logic, no practice by a lender could ever be
‘unfair.’” Cmty. Fin. Servs. Ass’n. of Am. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 558 F.Supp.3d 350,
362 (W.D. Tex. 2021) (upholding the Payday Lending Rule).
249. See Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 82 Fed. Reg. at
54737.
250. See id. at 54738.
251. See id. at 54739–42.
252. Id. § 5531(d).
253. Id. § 5531(d)(1).
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(3) a consumer’s reasonable reliance on a covered person to act in their best
interest.254
The bureau concluded that repeated withdrawal attempts take
unreasonable advantage of a consumer’s lack of understanding of the
material risks, costs, and conditions of the loan.255
The bureau
acknowledged that, as a general matter, consumers understand that they must
repay loans, and that failing to do so may result in fees.256 However, the
bureau determined that borrowers are not aware of the risks and harms
associated with repeated withdrawal attempts, which, as noted in the
substantial injury prong of the unfairness analysis, results in significant cost
to the borrower.257
The bureau also concluded that consumers were unable to protect their
interests in relation to the unexpected costs of repeated withdrawal
attempts.258 The bureau noted that, “[b]y the time consumers discover that
lenders are using their authorizations in this manner, it is often too late for
them to take effective action.”259 Often, the only protective measure
available to a borrower is to close their account, a measure that the bureau
considered impractical, “given that consumers use their accounts to conduct
most of their household financial transactions.”260
Finally, the bureau determined that repeated withdrawal attempts take
unreasonable advantage of consumers’ inability to protect themselves.261
The bureau noted that the practice of obtaining prior authorization to
withdraw payments is not, standing alone, an abusive practice.262 However,
the bureau determined that the unrestrained use of the authorization to
generate fees, with little probability of obtaining payment from the borrower,
is abusive within the meaning of the CFPA.263
To date, the Payday Lending Rule is the only CFPB regulation
promulgated pursuant to the bureau’s UDAAP authority.264 However, as
discussed in Part III, the bureau’s approach to collection practices in the
payday lending context provide a useful model for how the CFPB might use
its rulemaking authority to limit bank account garnishment more generally.
To further illustrate the regulatory authority of the bureau, the next section
discusses the use of UDAAP in prior CFPB enforcement actions.

254.
255.
54741.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Id. § 5531(d)(2).
See Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 82 Fed. Reg. at
See id. at 54740.
See id. at 54740–41.
See id. at 54742.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 54743.
See id.
See id. at 54744.
See LEVITIN, supra note 23, at 188.
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2. “Unfair and Abusive” in CFPB Enforcement Actions
The CFPB’s use of the unfair and abusive standard in enforcement actions
likewise illustrates how the bureau might regulate unrestricted bank account
garnishment. The following section details the CFPB enforcement action in
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Think Finance, LLC,265 where the
bureau argued that certain collection practices were unfair and abusive.
In Think Finance, the bureau used its UDAAP authority as the basis for a
consent order that enjoined a lender from collecting on usurious loans that
violated state law.266 There, the defendant collaborated with tribal nations to
provide high-cost loans to consumers across the United States.267 These
loans charged interest at a rate of up to 450 percent annually,268 despite state
usury laws that declare loans in excess of certain interest limits to be void.269
Despite these usury laws, the defendant executed direct transfers from a
customer’s bank account to repay the usurious loans.270
In its complaint, the CFPB argued that it was an unfair practice to collect
loans that were void and unenforceable under state law.271 The bureau
argued that extracting payment from consumers for unenforceable loans
caused substantial injury.272 Such injury was not reasonably avoidable
because consumers were unable to avoid bank account seizures, and because
consumers were likely unaware of the laws which limited their obligation to
repay.273 These injuries harmed competition by placing law-abiding lenders
at a relative disadvantage.274
The bureau also argued that the defendant’s practices were abusive.275 The
bureau found that a consumer’s legal obligation to repay is “a material risk,
cost, or condition of a loan.”276 According to the bureau, the defendant took
unreasonable advantage of consumers’ lack of understanding of this material
condition by collecting amounts exceeding the consumers’ legal
obligation.277
This section has discussed how the CFPB has used its UDAAP authority
in prior rulemaking and enforcement actions. As demonstrated by the
Payday Lending Rule and in Think Finance, the bureau has used its UDAAP
authority to limit unfair and abusive collection practices in the past. These

265. Stipulated Final Consent Order, No. 17-cv-00127 (D. Mont. Feb. 6, 2020), ECF No.
107.
266. Id. ¶¶ 15–16.
267. First Amended Complaint ¶ 52, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Think Fin., LLC, No.
17-cv-00127 (D. Mont. Mar. 28, 2018), ECF No. 38.
268. Id. ¶ 28.
269. Id. ¶ 112.
270. Id. ¶ 90.
271. Id. ¶¶ 144, 156.
272. Id. ¶ 144.
273. Id. ¶ 145.
274. Id. ¶ 148.
275. Id. ¶ 155.
276. Id. ¶ 152.
277. Id. ¶ 154.
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actions serve as a potential model for how the CFPB can regulate bank
account garnishment more generally.
Next, Part III resolves the issues presented throughout this part. Part III.A
returns to the issue of bank account garnishments under the CCPA and
recommends that the law be enforced to protect deposited wages. Part III.B
then recommends, as an alternative, that the CFPB engage in rulemaking to
designate and prohibit unrestrained bank account garnishment as an unfair
and abusive practice.
III. PROTECTING BANK ACCOUNTS FROM UNRESTRAINED GARNISHMENT
Since the CCPA’s enactment in 1968, the consumer credit industry has
dramatically changed.278 Today, nearly seventy million Americans have a
debt in collections,279 and creditors file millions of actions annually to collect
on outstanding debts.280 As indebtedness and debt collection have
skyrocketed, courts have narrowly construed the CCPA, leaving millions of
Americans vulnerable to unrestricted garnishment of deposited wages.281
This part argues that, considering these changes, federal action must be
taken to afford debtors the basic protections enumerated in the CCPA. Part
III.A argues that the CCPA should be enforced to protect deposited wages.
In the absence of judicial enforcement of the CCPA’s protections, Part III.B
argues that the CFPB should engage in rulemaking to prohibit unrestricted
bank account garnishment as an unfair and abusive act.
A. Resolving the Conflicting Approaches to the CCPA’s
Garnishment Provisions
This section argues that the CCPA’s garnishment limitations should apply
to wages deposited into a bank account. Part III.A.1 demonstrates how the
statute’s text supports its application to deposited wages. Part III.A.2 then
argues that both precedent and statutory purpose support protecting bank
accounts from garnishment. Finally, Part III.A.3 recommends how courts
can apply the CCPA’s garnishment provisions to wages deposited in a bank.
1. Textualist Support for the CCPA’s Application to Bank Accounts
The CCPA provides that a creditor may not garnish more than 25 percent
of a worker’s aggregate weekly disposable earnings.282 These restrictions
raise two distinct, albeit related, interpretive questions: first, what third
parties must abide by the law’s garnishment provisions, and second, do
wages, once deposited, retain their quality as “earnings” within the meaning
of the act?283 This section provides textual support for the position that banks
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

See supra Part I.A.
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A.1.
15 U.S.C. § 1673.
See supra Part II.A.
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are subject to the law’s provisions, and that wages remain exempt after
deposit.
Nothing in the CCPA’s statutory text suggests that banks should be
excluded from the act’s provisions.284
The CCPA provides that
“garnishment” means “any legal or equitable procedure through which the
earnings of any individual are required to be withheld for payment of any
debt.”285 A garnishment served on a bank is certainly a legal procedure that
creditors use to satisfy a debt.286 Given that the Supreme Court has held that
exemption statutes like the CCPA should be “liberally construed,” banks
should not be excluded from the act’s coverage absent explicit language
limiting the law’s application.287
Similarly, the fact that the CCPA does not explicitly refer to banks should
not be understood as evidence that Congress intended to exclude them from
the act’s provisions. The act also omits explicit reference to employers, but
this has not prevented courts from applying the law’s provisions in the
employment context.288 Moreover, the statutes at issue in Porter and
Philpott also omit explicit reference to banks, but in both cases, the Court
exempted benefits from garnishment after deposit by the beneficiary.289
Congress used broad language in the CCPA to limit “any legal or equitable
procedure” used to collect “any debt.”290 Such broad language suggests that
all garnishments are covered by the act, not merely garnishments of an
employer.
The statutory language also indicates that wages retain their quality as
“earnings” after deposit.291 The act defines “earnings” as “compensation
paid or payable for personal services.”292 The term “paid” is not defined by
the statute and therefore assumes its ordinary meaning.293 “Paid” is the past
tense of “pay.” To “pay” means “to give in return for goods or service,”294
while “paid” denotes the receipt of such payment.295 By including “paid” in
its provisions, the act explicitly applies to wages after they have been
distributed.

284. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1672–1673.
285. Id. § 1672(c).
286. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
287. See Porter v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 370 U.S. 159, 162 (1962).
288. See Usery v. First Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 586 F.2d 107, 108 (9th Cir. 1978)
(acknowledging that the act does not apply to employers “by any explicit language”).
289. See supra notes 203–15 and accompanying text.
290. 15 U.S.C. § 1672(c).
291. See, e.g., supra note 194 and accompanying text.
292. 15 U.S.C. § 1672(a).
293. See Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 566 (2012) (“When a term goes
undefined in a statute, we give the term its ordinary meaning.”).
294. Pay,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/pay
[https://perma.cc/7BJE-GDQR] (last visited Oct. 7, 2022).
295. See Paid, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/paid
[https://perma.cc/4F59-7SJQ] (last visited Oct. 7, 2022) (defining “paid” as “marked by the
receipt of pay,” or “being or having been paid or paid for”).
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In Usery, the court strained to limit the “paid or payable” language of the
act to exclude compensation paid to an employee.296 The court found that
“paid” means “those amounts which have been accrued on the employer’s
books, and thus are ‘paid’ in the accounting sense, even though such funds
have not yet been transmitted to the employee.”297 In other words,
“compensation paid” within the statute indicates an employer’s outstanding
obligation to pay an employee.
This interpretation of “paid” renders the term “payable” redundant. The
canon against surplusage instructs that courts should not “construe [a] statute
in a manner that is strained and, at the same time . . . render a statutory term
superfluous.”298 In Usery, the court does both: it abandons the ordinary
meaning of “paid” in favor of a technical term of art, and it deprives
“payable” of any independent meaning. “Payable” ordinarily means a sum
of money that “is to be paid” but is not necessarily yet due, such as an
employer’s outstanding obligation to pay an employee.299 In Usery, the court
attributes this meaning to the word “paid” and ignores the term “payable”
altogether.
Moreover, the Usery court’s strained interpretation of “paid or payable” is
at odds with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the same language as used
in the Social Security Act.300 The Social Security Act provides that “none of
the moneys paid or payable or rights existing under this subchapter shall be
subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal
process.”301 In Philpott, the Court found that exempt benefits deposited in
an account were “moneys paid” within the meaning of the statute.302 This
interpretation of “paid or payable” comports with ordinary meaning and
should be applied to the CCPA.
The statutory text demonstrates that the CCPA contemplates limitations on
all garnishments, not just those of an employer, and protects wages, even
after they have been paid and deposited into a bank.303 The relevant case law
supports such a construction,304 and many state courts that have considered
the issue are in accord.305 In 1891, the Colorado Supreme Court addressed
this issue with clarity.306 The court imagined a worker who has $100 of

296. See Usery v. First Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 586 F.2d 107, 110 (9th Cir. 1978).
297. Id.
298. Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 476–77 (2003).
299. Payable, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“Of a sum of money . . . that is
to be paid . . . . An amount may be payable without being due. Debts are commonly payable
long before they fall due.”); see also Payable, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/payable [https://perma.cc/YZB4-JSXE] (last visited Oct. 7, 2022)
(“[M]ay, can, or must be paid.”).
300. See Philpott v. Essex Cnty. Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1973).
301. 42 U.S.C. § 407.
302. Philpott, 409 U.S. at 415–16.
303. See supra notes 282–302.
304. See Porter v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 370 U.S. 159 (1962); Philpott, 409 U.S. at
415–16.
305. See supra Part II.A.2.
306. See Rutter v. Shumway, 26 P. 321 (Colo. 1891).
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monthly wages garnished immediately upon receipt.307 It wrote: “Think of
the court gravely responding: ‘Yes, the money was your wages before you
received it, and was exempt, but, having received it, it is no longer wages,
but capital, and is not exempt. You were entitled to enjoy it before you
received it, but not afterwards.’ What mockery.”308 Due to the prevailing
interpretation of the CCPA, for millions of Americans today, the Colorado
Supreme Court’s imagined farce is an unfortunate reality.
2. Precedential and Purposive Support for the CCPA’s Application
to Bank Accounts
Kokoszka v. Belford309 is the only U.S. Supreme Court case to consider the
CCPA’s garnishment provisions. In it, the Court provided insight into both
the purpose and function of the CCPA’s statutory scheme. This section
argues that the Court’s holding in Kokoszka and the CCPA’s purpose support
extending the law’s provisions to protect wages deposited into a bank
account.
In Kokoszka, the Court held that an income tax refund is not “earnings”
within the meaning of the statute.310 The Court found that the CCPA was
intended to protect “compensation needed to support the wage earner and his
family on a week-to-week, month-to-month basis” but did not protect “every
asset that is traceable in some way to such compensation.”311 Relying on this
decision, the Usery court held that deposited funds, “[l]ike a lump sum tax
return . . . has neither an element of periodicity nor the critical relationship to
a person’s subsistence that a paycheck does.”312
This interpretation does not reflect the commercial reality of modern
American life. Today, 94 percent of Americans receive their paycheck via
direct deposit,313 and many, if not most, live paycheck to paycheck.314
Unlike a tax refund, which arrives annually, a bank account generally
represents little more than a debtor’s periodic wages and bears critically on a
debtor’s day-to-day subsistence.315 For the millions of Americans receiving
direct deposit, wages cannot be accessed until they are deposited.
Finally, the Court’s decision in Kokoszka demonstrates how the CCPA’s
purpose supports its application to bank accounts. Many courts refusing to
extend the act to banks find that such an application would not further the
law’s aim of preserving employment.316 However, the preservation of
employment is not the sole, or even the primary, purpose of the act.317 The
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

Id. at 322.
Id.
417 U.S. 642 (1974).
Id. at 651.
Id.
Usery v. First Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 586 F.2d 107, 110 (9th Cir. 1978).
See supra note 12.
See SERVON, supra note 18, at 48.
Id.
See supra notes 154–57 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 84–95 and accompanying text.
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statute and its legislative record demonstrate that Congress limited
garnishment to prevent bankruptcy.318 As the Court noted in Kokoszka,
“[t]here is every indication that Congress, in an effort to avoid the necessity
of bankruptcy, sought to regulate garnishment . . . of compensation needed
to support the wage earner and his family.”319 In rejecting the act’s
application to banks, courts have frustrated this essential purpose. By failing
to protect wages after receipt, the courts have deprived debtors of any
meaningful protection that may forestall bankruptcy.320
In sum, the statute’s language, purpose, and precedential interpretations
support the protection of wages after deposit. However, as noted in Usery,
the application of the law to bank accounts presents administrative
questions.321 The following section discusses how courts can operationalize
the CCPA’s garnishment provisions to protect deposited wages.
3. Applying the CCPA to Banks
This section argues that the enforcement of the Social Security Act’s
exemption provisions provides a model for the CCPA’s application to bank
accounts. Accordingly, courts should declare that deposited wages are
exempt from garnishment and ensure that states afford debtors due process
in asserting these exemption rights.
To protect deposited wages, a court must first declare that the CCPA’s
exemptions apply to wages after deposit. If this is done, then any state
garnishment law that fails to afford wages such protection will be preempted
by the federal statute.322 However, to protect bank accounts under the act, a
court must adopt a standard to distinguish deposited wages, which are
exempt, from other money that may be seized by a creditor, an issue that the
statute does not explicitly address.323
There are a variety of tests available to distinguish exempt deposited
wages. For example, in the context of federal benefits, Porter and Philpott
adopted a “permanent investment” standard, exempting benefits from
garnishment so long as they are readily available to support a debtor.324
Conversely, permanent investments, like money invested in speculative
ventures or in time deposits at interest, are not exempt.325 In the context of
its state CCPA analogue, the Iowa Supreme Court held that wages remain
318. See Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974) (“Congress’ concern was . . . the
prevention of bankruptcy in the first place by eliminating ‘an essential element in the predatory
extension of credit . . . .’” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 90-1040, at 20 (1967)).
319. Id. at 651.
320. See Brown v. Commonwealth, 40 S.W.3d 873, 879 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999) (“[W]hile the
debtor’s plunge into bankruptcy is made likely if all or most of his wages are intercepted
before he receives them, confiscation of the debtor’s wages immediately after receipt tends
toward the same result.”).
321. See supra notes 151–52 and accompanying text.
322. 15 U.S.C. § 1673(c).
323. See supra notes 151–52 and accompanying text.
324. Philpott v. Essex Cnty. Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413, 416 (1973); Porter v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 370 U.S. 159, 162 (1962).
325. Porter, 370 U.S. at 162.

2022]

UNFAIR, ABUSIVE, AND UNLAWFUL

675

exempt until a debtor has a “reasonable opportunity to negotiate the paycheck
and spend the funds,” which the court defined as ninety days preceding a
garnishment order.326 In applying the CCPA to deposited wages, courts
could use either the “permanent investment” or “reasonable opportunity”
standard to identify protected deposited earnings.
Although the CCPA can establish a federal exemption for deposited
wages, it must be enforced by the states.327 The CCPA itself does not
establish or replace state procedural law governing garnishment.328 It merely
provides a baseline standard of protection and preempts state laws that fail to
enforce these requirements.329
However, if a federal exemption of deposited earnings is established, states
must afford debtors due process in asserting the right to protect these
funds.330 In the event of a garnishment of exempt social security benefits,
due process requires that a debtor be provided (1) notice of the garnishment,
(2) notice of the exemption, and (3) a prompt opportunity to challenge the
seizure and assert the exemption.331 The notice must clearly explain a
debtor’s procedural rights and remedies,332 and, given that a “bank account
may well contain the money that a person needs for [the] . . . basic
requirements of life,” a delay of even fifteen days for a hearing may be
insufficient.333 State laws that fail to meet these requirements would be
unconstitutional, and courts may be prohibited from issuing garnishments
under such laws.334
The enforcement of the Social Security Act’s exemption provisions
described above provides a model for the CCPA’s enforcement. At a
minimum, before executing a bank account garnishment, debtors should be
notified of their right to protect wages and be given a meaningful opportunity
to assert any applicable exemptions. Allowing creditors to empty bank
accounts without providing debtors with notice and an opportunity to be
heard frustrates debtors’ due process rights and denies them the basic
protections afforded by the CCPA.
In conclusion, the CCPA’s language and purpose support its application to
wages deposited into a bank. Accordingly, 75 percent of deposited wages
should remain exempt from garnishment. If a creditor attempts to seize
326. MidAmerica Sav. Bank v. Miehe, 438 N.W.2d 837, 839–40 (Iowa 1989).
327. See infra notes 328–29 and accompanying text.
328. See Evans v. Evans, 429 F. Supp. 580, 582 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (“The federal statutes
dealing with garnishment are not an attempt to create or establish garnishment proceedings
but are meant only to pre-empt state laws which are less restrictive.” (citation omitted)).
329. See id.; see also Crane v. Crane, 417 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Okla. 1976).
330. See Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d 1344, 1350 (1st Cir. 1985) (“[Debtor’s] interest in
retaining her exempt social security funds free from attachment was the kind of property
interest that is entitled to due process protection.”); McCahey v. L.P. Invs., 774 F.2d 543, 547
(2d Cir. 1985); Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 56 (3d Cir. 1980).
331. See McCahey, 774 F.2d at 549; Dionne, 757 F.2d at 1354; Finberg, 634 F.2d at
59–62.
332. Dionne, 757 F.2d at 1352.
333. Finberg, 634 F.2d at 58.
334. See Dionne, 757 F.2d at 1345; Finberg, 634 F.2d at 64.
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exempted wages from a bank account, debtors should be given notice of their
exemption and provided a meaningful opportunity to assert their rights.
Judicial enforcement of the act’s provisions to bank accounts is critical to
reining in the “unrestricted garnishment of compensation” that the law was
designed to end.335
Next, this Note addresses an alternative approach to protecting bank
accounts from unrestrained garnishment. Building on the discussion in Part
II.B, Part III.B recommends that the CFPB engage in rulemaking pursuant to
its UDAAP authority to limit bank account garnishment as an unfair and
abusive practice.
B. The CFPB Should Engage in Rulemaking to Prohibit Unrestricted
Bank Account Garnishment
As an alternative to applying the CCPA to deposited wages, this section
argues that the CFPB should use its UDAAP authority to identify and
prohibit unrestricted bank account garnishment. This section builds on the
examples provided in Part II.B to demonstrate that unrestricted bank account
garnishment is both an unfair and abusive practice, and as such, is within the
rulemaking authority of the CFPB. This section ultimately concludes by
discussing how the CFPB may design a rule to limit abusive bank account
garnishment.
As illustrated in Part II.B, unfair practices require primary consideration
of three elements: (1) substantial injury to consumers that is (2) not
reasonably avoidable by consumers and (3) is not outweighed by
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.336
Regarding the first prong, unrestricted garnishment of a debtor’s bank
account causes substantial injury to consumers.337 Conrad Goetzinger’s
story provides an instructive example.338 When he was twenty-nine-years
old, Mr. Goetzinger faced repeated bank account garnishments due to a
$2,400 debt he owed for a laptop he bought while in high school.339 In
addition to having his wages garnished, his bank account was emptied
twice.340 Unaware of the garnishments, he continued to use the account,
incurring repeated overdraft fees totaling several hundred dollars.341 In the
end, he was forced to close the account to protect his future wages from
seizure.342 In the payday lending context, the CFPB found that acts that

335. 15 U.S.C. § 1671(a).
336. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
337. See, e.g., supra notes 1–7, 72–76 and accompanying text.
338. See Paul Kiel, Old Debts, Fresh Pain: Weak Laws Offer Debtors Little Protection,
PROPUBLICA (Sept. 16, 2014, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/old-debts-freshpain-weak-laws-offer-debtors-little-protection [https://perma.cc/LEB4-XB4D].
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id.
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generate excessive fees and account closure, as here, impose a substantial
injury constituting an unfair practice.343
Unrestricted garnishment also causes substantial injury to the public.344
For debtors, it can lead to catastrophic results—like the loss of a home, car,
or employment—preventing a debtor from providing basic necessities for
themselves and their families.345 Deprived of their basic needs, debtors are
more likely to turn to the state for assistance.346 Indeed, in enacting the
CCPA, Congress noted that the disruption to “employment, production, and
consumption” caused by unrestricted garnishment imposed “substantial
burden[s] on interstate commerce.”347
Regarding the second prong, debtors are unlikely to be able to reasonably
avoid the injuries caused by unrestricted bank account garnishment.348 First,
because garnishment requires a third-party proceeding, debtors are not likely
to know when or whether their bank accounts will be seized.349 This lack of
notice makes it difficult for consumers to take measures to protect wages, for
example by canceling direct deposit or by closing an account
preemptively.350 In CFPB enforcement actions, lack of notice of impending
injury led to the finding that an injury was not reasonably avoidable.351
Moreover, the only realistic means of avoiding the injury imposed by
unrestricted bank account garnishment is to cancel direct deposit or close the
bank account altogether.352 In prior rulemaking, the bureau found that such
measures impose an undue burden on consumers because “consumers use
their accounts to conduct most of their household financial transactions.”353
Similarly, the bureau has found that repaying a creditor or avoiding the loan
in the first place is not a reasonable means of preventing injury.354
Regarding the third prong, the costs imposed by unfettered garnishment
are not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or

343. See supra notes 242–45 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text.
345. See CARTER, supra note 72, at 5–6.
346. See id. at 6 (“[E]xemption laws . . . can also act as an economic recovery tool that will
steer money into state and local communities. [They] also save costs that taxpayers would
otherwise have to bear for services such as emergency shelter and foster care.”).
347. 15 U.S.C. § 1671.
348. See infra notes 349–54.
349. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
350. See, e.g., supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text (illustrating an example of a surprise
garnishment of a health-care worker).
351. In re Cottonwood Fin., Ltd., CFPB No. 2020-CFPB-0001 (Apr. 1, 2020)
(“Consumers . . . could not reasonably have avoided the harm because they did not know
whether, when, or how these calls might occur and had no control over Respondent’s use of
these collection tactics.”).
352. See, e.g., Kiel, supra note 338 (providing an example of a consumer closing an
account to prevent further garnishment).
353. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 82 Fed. Reg. 54472,
54736 (Nov. 17, 2017).
354. See id. at 54736; see also Cmty. Fin. Servs. Ass’n. of Am. v. Consumer Fin. Prot.
Bureau, 558 F. Supp. 3d 350, 362 (W.D. Tex. 2021) (rejecting the reasonableness of repaying
or avoiding a loan because, “[b]y that logic, no practice by a lender could ever be ‘unfair’”).
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competition.355 In conducting this analysis, bureau guidance suggests that
benefits may include lower prices or wider availability of financial services,
while costs may include “the costs to society as a whole of any increased
burden.”356 In the payday lending context, the low success rate of repeated
withdrawal attempts did not outweigh the costs imposed on already
distressed borrowers.357
Here, unrestricted garnishment benefits creditors by allowing collection of
the full value of a debt without regard to a debtor’s ability to pay.358 These
benefits may be passed onto consumers in the form of cheaper credit.359
However, limiting garnishment, for example by applying CCPA limits to
deposited wages,360 does not eliminate the benefits of the practice; it merely
delays repayment by permitting a debtor to retain a percentage of their
earnings.361 The relative convenience to creditors does not offset the onerous
costs imposed on debtors and the public.362 The ubiquity of state laws
limiting debt collection speaks to a wide recognition of the social costs that
the practice would impose if left unrestrained.363
Unrestricted bank account garnishment also constitutes an “abusive”
practice because it takes unreasonable advantage of a consumer’s lack of
understanding of the material conditions of a loan.364 A consumer’s legal
obligation to repay is a material condition of a loan.365 In Think Finance, the
bureau found the creditor’s seizure of a bank account to be abusive because
it took unreasonable advantage of the consumer’s lack of awareness of state
law limiting their obligation to repay.366
Unrestricted bank account garnishment likewise takes unreasonable
advantage of a consumer’s lack of understanding. Here, federal law places
limits on the wages that a creditor may seize.367 A debtor may close an
account or cancel direct deposit, forcing a creditor to execute a garnishment
against their employer, thereby ensuring that the federal garnishment limits
are honored.368 However, as seen in Think Finance, debtors are not likely to

355. See infra notes 358–63 and accompanying text.
356. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB CONSUMER LAWS AND REGULATIONS:
UNFAIR,
DECEPTIVE,
OR
ABUSIVE
ACTS
OR
PRACTICES
3
(2022),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_unfair-deceptive-abusive-acts-practicesudaaps_procedures.pdf [https://perma.cc/36DL-TVRP].
357. See Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 82 Fed. Reg. at
54738.
358. See generally Zywicki, supra note 70, at 3 (discussing the market benefits of lax
collection laws).
359. See id.
360. See supra Part III.A.3.
361. See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text.
362. See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text.
363. See CARTER, supra note 72, at 4 (“Every state has a set of exemption laws, intended
to prevent creditors from pushing consumers and their families into destitution.”).
364. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d)(1); see also supra notes 122–25.
365. First Amended Complaint, supra note 267, ¶ 152.
366. Id. ¶¶ 154–55.
367. See supra Part I.C.1.
368. See supra note 332.

2022]

UNFAIR, ABUSIVE, AND UNLAWFUL

679

understand that the law offers such protections.369 Creditors take
unreasonable advantage of this lack of understanding when they empty a
debtor’s account. As in Think Finance, such acts are abusive within the
meaning of the CFPA.370
Accordingly, unrestricted bank account garnishment is both an unfair and
abusive practice and is therefore within the regulatory authority of the CFPB.
To protect debtors from the substantial harms discussed above, the bureau
should engage in rulemaking to limit the practice.
Indeed, there is administrative precedent for regulating unrestricted bank
account garnishment that could serve as a model for future CFPB
rulemaking. In 2011, the U.S. Department of the Treasury promulgated a
rule that ended bank account garnishment for certain federal benefits.371
Until that point, federal benefits were under siege by debt buyers.372 In
response to the tens of thousands of monthly account seizures,373 the
Department of the Treasury promulgated a rule that required banks to
preserve exempt federal benefits in a bank account for two months before
complying with a garnishment order.374
This rule could serve as a model for how to curtail abusive bank account
garnishments. The CFPB should require banks to preserve a minimum
amount of funds in a bank account before honoring a garnishment order.375
Several states offer this type of protection for bank accounts.376 Such a
policy has the benefit of being simple to administer, as it does not require a
debtor to take any action to assert an exemption, and it does not require the
bank to determine the source of the funds, as is the case with federal
benefits.377
Creditors may argue that a rule protecting a minimum amount in a bank
account would make it nearly impossible to collect, and would thereby
reduce the availability of credit to consumers overall.378 For example, in
2018, a Connecticut bill proposed an automatic protection of up to $1,000 in
a bank account.379 In opposition, Encore Capital Group, the nation’s largest
debt buyer,380 wrote that the bill would “mak[e] it impossible for creditors to
obtain [deposited] funds, [and] would encourage consumers to shield money

369. First Amended Complaint, supra note 267, ¶ 145 (“Consumers were unlikely to know
that that Subject States’ usury laws . . . limited consumers’ obligation to repay . . . .”).
370. See supra note 366.
371. See 31 C.F.R. § 212 (2021).
372. See Saunders & Tyler, supra note 33, at 45.
373. Id.
374. 31 C.F.R. § 212.6 (2021).
375. The CFPB has regulatory authority over any entity that engages in offering or
providing a consumer financial product or service, including banks. See 12 U.S.C. § 5481.
376. For example, in New York, the first $3,600 in an account is automatically protected.
See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
377. See CARTER, supra note 72, at 24 (explaining the importance of self-executing
protections).
378. See infra notes 381–82 and accompanying text.
379. See Kiel & Ernsthausen, supra note 33.
380. Id.
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in a bank account.”381 Encore warned that, “[w]ithout the ability to recoup
valid debt obligations, creditors will have little incentive to lend money to
Connecticut consumers in the first place.”382
However, contrary to the industry’s contentions, protecting a minimum
amount in a bank account does not make debt collection impossible. First,
limiting bank account garnishment does nothing to diminish a creditor’s
entitlement to collect; creditors would remain able to seize all funds beyond
a set minimum.383 Moreover, such a rule would preserve a creditor’s ability
to execute a wage garnishment against a debtor’s employer, allowing them
to seize wages in compliance with the CCPA.384 Although this might delay
repayment, it does not make collection impossible. On the contrary, by
indirectly enforcing the federal limits on wage garnishment, such a rule
preserves a creditor’s right to collect, while protecting debtors and the public
from the severe costs of unlimited garnishment.
In conclusion, unrestricted bank account garnishment is an unfair and
abusive practice.385 As such, pursuant to its UDAAP authority, the CFPB
should engage in rulemaking to limit the practice. In designing a rule, the
CFPB should seek to protect a minimum amount in a bank account from
garnishment. Such a rule preserves the rights of creditors to collect, while
protecting debtors and the public from the onerous costs of unfair and abusive
bank account garnishment.
CONCLUSION
Since the CCPA’s enactment in 1968, the consumer credit industry has
dramatically changed. Today, nearly seventy million Americans have a debt
in collections, and creditors file millions of actions annually to collect
outstanding debts. As indebtedness has skyrocketed, the law has failed to
keep pace to protect debtors and the public from the onerous social costs of
unrestrained debt collection.
To afford debtors the full protections of the CCPA, courts should enforce
its provisions to protect wages deposited into a bank account. Alternatively,
the CFPB should engage in rulemaking to limit the unrestrained garnishment
of bank accounts as an unfair and abusive practice. These interventions will
preserve a creditor’s ability to collect, while shielding debtors and their
families from destitution.

381. Memorandum from Sonia Gibson, Senior Manager, Gov’t Affs., Encore Cap. Grp., to
Joint Comm. on Banking, Connecticut State House of Reps. (Mar. 14, 2018),
https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/7221453/Document-Encore-Connecticut-BillOppose.pdf [https://perma.cc/ACG9-V67P].
382. Id.
383. For example, the rule promulgated by the Department of the Treasury indicates that if
no exempt benefits are contained in an account, then the bank “shall follow its otherwise
customary procedures for handling the garnishment order.” 31 C.F.R. § 212.5 (2021).
384. See supra Part I.C.1.
385. See supra notes 338–70 and accompanying text.

